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Abstract   
This article argues that an engagement with the political philosophy of Leo Strauss is of considerable 
value in International Relations (IR), in relation to the study of both recent US foreign policy and 
contemporary IR theory. The question of Straussian activities within and close to the foreign policy-
making establishment in the United States during the period leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
has been the focus of significant scholarly and popular attention in recent years. This article makes 
the case that several individuals influenced by Strauss exercised considerable influence in the fields 
of intelligence production, the media and think tanks, and traces the ways in which elements of 
“tƌauss͛ thought aƌe disĐeƌŶiďle iŶ theiƌ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs iŶ these spheƌes. It fuƌtheƌ aƌgues that “tƌauss͛ 
political philosophy is of broader significance for IR insofar as it can be read as a securitising 
response to the dangers he associated with the foundationlessness of the modern condition. The 
article demonstrates that the politics of this response are of crucial importance for contemporary 
debates between traditional and critical IR theorists. 
 
Introduction 
The political philosophy of Leo Strauss has been the subject of controversy within and beyond the 
disciple of International Relations (IR) in recent years, due in large part to the issue of the influence 
of Straussians in the US foreign policy-making establishment during the period leading up to the 
2003 invasion of Iraq. In Jean-FƌaŶĐois Dƌolet͛s ǀieǁ, ͚the growth of Straussianism as a school of 
political thought and its link to the neo-conservative movement and the Republican Party has led to 
a ǁide ƌaŶge of ĐoŶteŶtious Đlaiŵs aďout “tƌauss͛ alleged iŶflueŶĐe oŶ AŵeƌiĐaŶ politiĐs aŶd foƌeigŶ 
policy since the ϭϵϴϬs͛ ;ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϮͿ. “uĐh Đlaiŵs ďeĐaŵe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ǁidespƌead iŶ the post-
9/11security environment. As Nicholas Xenos notes,  
the onset of the US war on Iraq in the spring of 2003 brought with it a series of articles and 
radio discussions identifying a sŵall gƌoup ǁithiŶ aŶd aƌouŶd Geoƌge W. Bush͛s 
administration that had played a central role in shaping its foreign policy on Iraq and with 
intellectual roots stretching back to the otherwise obscure political philosopher Leo Strauss. 
(2008, p. 5) 
As two of “tƌauss͛ foƌŵeƌ studeŶts siŵilaƌlǇ attest, folloǁiŶg ϵ/ϭϭ “tƌauss Đaŵe to ďe ǀieǁed as the 
͚thiŶkeƌ ďehiŶd eǀeƌ-larger sets of political actors and policies, but most especially he was being 
ideŶtified as ͞the ďƌaiŶs͟ ďehiŶd Geoƌge W. Bush aŶd the IƌaƋ Waƌ͛ ;)uĐkeƌt aŶd )uĐkeƌt, ϮϬϬϲ, p. 
ix). 
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From 2003, the question of Straussian influence within the Bush administration received 
significant attention in the United States and international media (Ackerman and Judis, 2003; 
Cabrejas, 2003; Frachon and Vernet, 2003; Hersh, 2003; Leupp, 2003; Lobe, 2003; Shorris, 2004). 
“uĐh ǁas the puďliĐ iŶtƌigue that a plaǇ poƌtƌaǇiŶg “tƌauss as ͚the guidiŶg light of the Ŷeo-
ĐoŶseƌǀatiǀes, ǁho aƌe foƌgiŶg AŵeƌiĐa͛s Ŷeǁ foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ͛ ;MiŶoǁitz, ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϭϵͿ opeŶed iŶ 
2003.1 In addition, a three-part BBC documentary was broadcast in the United Kingdom in 2004, 
which drew parallels between the rise of militarised Islamic movements and Strauss-inspired 
neoconservatism.2 Concurrently, an increase in scholarly engagement with Straussianism occurred 
during this period, which resulted in the production of several noteworthy texts on the subject 
(Drury, 1999; Norton, 2004; Zuckert and Zuckert, 2006). Strauss and various Straussians also feature 
in books dedicated more broadly to post-9/11 US foreign policy (Woodward, 2002; Clarke, 2004; 
Dorrien, 2004b). 
From 2005, a modest body of literature exploring the question of Straussian influence in the 
US foreign policy establishment emerged in IR (Halper and Clarke, 2004; Connolly, 2005; George, 
2005; Williams, 2005; Owens, 2007; Xenos, 2008; Drolet, 2009; George, 2010; Drolet, 2011). This has 
ďeeŶ applauded oŶ the gƌouŶds that ͚this is a paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ fasĐiŶatiŶg issue ďeĐause “tƌauss is a ŵuĐh 
more interesting thinker than he initially appears to be and his political legacy a more potent and 
ĐoŵpelliŶg faĐtoƌ thaŶ is geŶeƌallǇ ƌealised iŶ aŶ I‘ ĐoŶteǆt͛ ;Geoƌge, ϮϬϬϱ, p. ϭϳϱͿ. ‘efleĐtiŶg the 
eŶgageŵeŶts outside the disĐipliŶe, eǆaŵiŶatioŶs of “tƌauss͛ thought iŶ I‘ haǀe teŶded to foĐus oŶ 
the question of the invasion of Iraq. Patricia Owens, for instance, claims that through an exploration 
of “tƌauss͛ thought it ͚is possiďle to uŶdeƌstaŶd the ĐoŶteŶtious politiĐal deďates suƌƌouŶdiŶg the 
iŶǀasioŶ aŶd oĐĐupatioŶ of IƌaƋ͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϮϲϳͿ. Jiŵ Geoƌge siŵilaƌlǇ states his iŶteŶtioŶ to ͚eǆploƌe 
eleŵeŶts of this ͞“tƌaussiaŶ͟ ageŶda ďǇ eŵphasisiŶg its sigŶifiĐaŶĐe foƌ U“ aŶd gloďal politiĐs iŶ 
geŶeƌal aŶd, iŶ ŵoƌe speĐifiĐ teƌŵs, foƌ the ǁaƌ iŶ IƌaƋ͛ ;ϮϬϬϱ, p. ϭϳϰͿ. 
There are at least three problems with the existing IR literature on Strauss and the 
Straussians, which this article seeks to address. First, recent contributions in the discipline have 
emphasised a connection between Straussian thought and the broader neoconservative movement 
in the United States ďeĐause, as Jiŵ Geoƌge asseƌts, ͚ŶeoĐoŶseƌǀatiǀes haǀe dƌaǁŶ fƌoŵ “tƌauss a 
theŵatiĐ ageŶda of soƌts͛ ;ϮϬϬϱ, p. ϭϳϰͿ. MiĐhael C. Williaŵs seeŵs to ĐoŶĐuƌ, ĐlaiŵiŶg that ͚theƌe is 
little douďt that “tƌauss͛ thiŶkiŶg has ďeeŶ iŶflueŶtial iŶ ŵaŶǇ aspeĐts of neoconservatism, and on 
the peƌsoŶal iŶtelleĐtual tƌajeĐtoƌǇ of keǇ iŶdiǀiduals͛ ;ϮϬϬϱ, pp. ϯϬϴ–309).3 Although explorations 
that draw out these connections certainly have purchase in IR, I would suggest that there exists a 
propensity to render neoconservatism and Straussianism indistinct in the discipline.4 Although 
powerful arguments have been made demonstrating their intellectual convergences, such as that 
developed by Jean-Francois Drolet (2011), it must also be borne in mind that the intellectual roots of 
neoconservatism extend beyond Strauss (Ehrman, 1995; Kristol, 1995; Stelzer, 2004; Murray, 2006; 
Drolet, 2011), and that by no means all or even most neoconservatives have engaged in a sustained 
ŵaŶŶeƌ ǁith “tƌauss͛ thought oƌ ǁoƌks.ϱ PƌeseŶtiŶg Ŷeoconservatism and Straussianism as one and 
the same phenomenon may serve rhetorical purposes, but such a conflation risks overstating the 
scope of Straussian influence, leaving those relying upon this connection as the basis of their 
argument open to the charge of imprecision, exaggeration and generalisation (Zuckert and Zuckert, 
2006; Minowitz, 2009). Accordingly, this article restricts itself to an exploration of the significance of 
Straussian thought and the activities of a group of Straussians during the period leading up to the 
invasion of Iraq, leaving the question of the broader neoconservative movement to one side. 
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A related problem is raised by James Costopoulos. He alleges that the existing literature fails 
to adequately demonstrate what comprises Straussianism as a political orientation. He asks: 
what are the intellectual commitmeŶts that ͚“tƌaussiaŶs͛ shaƌe?... This 
question is never asked and therefore never answered. Any serious effort 
to ĐoŶŶeĐt Leo “tƌauss aŶd the ͚“tƌaussiaŶs͛ to the Bush administration 
must answer this question. If no answer is possible, then no connection 
exists. (Costopoulos, 2005, pp. 271–272) 
 
Building upon existing work in IR and beyond, this article explicitly engages with this challenge, 
demonstrating that several noteǁoƌthǇ featuƌes of “tƌauss͛ thought ĐaŶ ďe ideŶtified aŶd tƌaĐed 
through the interventions of a group of Straussians active during the period leading up to the 
invasion of Iraq in the fields of intelligence production, the media and think tanks. 
Finally, in addition to conflating Straussianism and neoconservatism, existing accounts have 
fƌeƋueŶtlǇ eŶgaged ǁith “tƌauss͛ politiĐal philosophǇ oŶlǇ to the eǆteŶt of ĐoŶŶeĐtiŶg ĐeƌtaiŶ of 
“tƌauss͛ ideas to the ĐoŶduĐt of “tƌaussiaŶs iŶ ƌeĐeŶt U“ foƌeigŶ policy decisions, most often his 
apparent advocacy of the use of deceit in the political establishment, understood in terms of the 
PlatoŶiĐ ͚Noďle Lie͛ ;Geoƌge, ϮϬϬϱͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, this Đuƌtails the pƌoĐess of eǆploƌatioŶ pƌeŵatuƌelǇ 
insofar as it does not endeaǀouƌ to tease out ǁhat ŵaǇ ďe at stake iŶ “tƌauss͛ thought. Although 
these connections are significant in the study of US foreign policy, they are in themselves not the 
eŶd of the stoƌǇ. The politiĐs of “tƌauss͛ ƌespoŶse to the fouŶdatioŶless ĐoŶditioŶ of modernity, 
which underpins these connections, is of considerable significance in an IR context, both in the 
context of US foreign policy and more broadly for IR theory. 
 
The PolitiĐs of ModerŶity’s Aďyss 
The political philosophy of Leo Strauss can be read as one possible response to what he perceived to 
be the condition of foundationlessness underpinning modernity. As Drolet has argued, for Strauss 
the ͚EŶlighteŶŵeŶt͛s doĐtƌiŶal worship of reason had led to a world without any commanding truth 
in which all opinioŶs aƌe deeŵed of eƋual ǁoƌth… This created a moral void at the heart of modern 
soĐieties͛ ;ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϲͿ. “uĐh a ǀoid oƌ aďǇss ƌepƌesents the emptiness left once all foundational 
beliefs have been undermined; it signifies the vacuum remaining once values, ontology and 
metaphysics have been shown to be without essential or stable foundations. IŶ GƌaĐe JaŶtzeŶ͛s 
words, the aďǇss sigŶifies ͚the ƌeŵoǀal of guaƌaŶtees of Đeƌtainty or ontological foundations upon 
which truth, whether metaphysical, ethical, or political could be grounded, the end of a 
͞ŵetaphǇsiĐs of pƌeseŶĐe͟ as aŶ aŶĐhoƌ poiŶt foƌ tƌuth͛ (2003, p. 256). Strauss was profoundly 
affected by this destabilisation of the foundations of metaphysics, and deeply preoccupied with the 
philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger, from which he saw it to be emanating (Lampert, 1996; 
Zuckert, 1996; Smith, 2007). Indeed, it has been suggested that Heideggeƌ ͚is the unnamed presence 
to whom or against whoŵ all of “tƌauss͛s ǁƌitiŶgs aƌe diƌeĐted͛ ;“ŵith, ϮϬϬϳ, p. 109). 
Strauss traced the undermining of metaphysical foundations through modern philosophy, 
from Machiavelli (Strauss, 1973), through Nietzsche (Strauss, 1965) and Heidegger (Strauss, in 
Pangle, 1989), and perceived its ramifications in modern social science, in which objectivity was no 
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longer possible (Strauss, 1973), and the crisis of Western politics, in which the West had lost its 
identity and purpose (Strauss, 1978). The consequences of this destabilisation were that, by 
denying the significance, if not the existence, of universal norms, the 
historical school destroyed the only solid basis of all efforts to transcend 
the actual y Since any universal principles make at least most men 
potentially homeless, it depreciated universal principles in favour of 
histoƌiĐal pƌiŶĐiples… The only standards that remain were of a purely 
subjective character, standards that had no other support than the free 
choice of the individual. No objective criterion henceforth allowed 
the distinction between good and bad choices. Historicism culminated 
in nihilism. The attempt to make man absolutely at home in this 
ǁoƌld eŶded iŶ ŵaŶ͛s ďeĐoŵiŶg aďsolutelǇ hoŵeless. ;“tƌauss, ϭϵϲϱ, 
pp. 15–18) 
 
The undermining of the foundations of society meant, for Strauss, a descent into relativism and 
nihilism. This is because the abyss renders man unable to judge or conceptualise the good; for 
Strauss, ŵaŶ ͚ĐaŶŶot liǀe ǁithout light, guidance, knowledge; only through knowledge of the good 
can he find the good that he Ŷeeds͛ ;ϭϵϲϱ, p. ϳϰͿ. This condition is both empty and terrifying 
ďeĐause ͚the NothiŶg… cannot arouse an enthusiastic and life-iŶspiƌiŶg Yes͛ (Strauss, in Lampert, 
1996, p. 195). The exposure of the abyss entails that justice cannot be possible for Strauss; he claims 
that Socrates concedes to ThƌasǇŵaĐhus, iŶ Plato͛s ‘epuďliĐ, that justiĐe is simply a socially 
necessary artifice (Strauss, 1978, p. 83), that the will of the stronger comprises justice, as no 
foundational premises exist.6 
“tƌauss͛ life͛s ǁoƌk ĐaŶ ďe read as an attempt to counter or mitigate this descent into 
nihilism and despair; in LarrǇ Geoƌge͛s estiŵatioŶ, “tƌauss͛ thought ĐaŶ ďe uŶdeƌstood as ͚a lifeloŶg 
cƌusade agaiŶst ͞ƌelatiǀisŵ͟ aŶd ͞histoƌiĐisŵ͟ ͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϮϲϮͿ. “uĐh a Đƌusade ǁas necessary for 
Strauss precisely because of the power of the Nietzschean and Heideggerian challenges to 
ŵetaphǇsiĐs. As ‘oseŶ Ŷotes, it is ͚Ƌuite Đleaƌ fƌoŵ “tƌauss͛s oǁŶ ǁoƌds that he has no adequate 
defeŶse agaiŶst Heideggeƌ͛s fundamental views, nor does he find any prospect of assistance in the 
various philosophical positions of his daǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϭϮϯͿ. The pƌiŵaƌǇ ŵeaŶs ďǇ ǁhiĐh he sought to 
mitigate the (in his view) pernicious effects of the consequent foundationlessness was an advocation 
of the development of social myths that might serve as substitute premises from which society 
might infer its meaning and purpose. Strauss ƌefeƌs to suĐh ŵǇths as ͚salutaƌǇ opiŶioŶs͛; he claimed 
that it ͚ǁould Ŷot ďe strange if Socrates had tried to lead those who are able to think toward the 
truth and to lead the others toward agreement in salutary opinions or to confirm them in such 
opiŶioŶs͛ ;ϭϵϳϴ, pp. ϱϯ–54Ϳ. Foƌ “tƌauss, ͚opiŶioŶ is the element of society y [and] every society 
rests, in the last analysis, on specific values or on specific myths, i.e., on assumptions which are not 
evidently superior or preferable to any alternative assumptioŶs͛ ;“tƌauss, ϭϵϳϯ, p. ϮϮϮͿ. Such 
opinions or myths provide the basis from which society takes its bearings, from which its raison 
d͛etƌe might be inferred: 
For if even the best city stands or falls by a fundamental falsehood, albeit 
a noble falsehood, it can be expected that the opinions on which the 
imperfect cities rest or in which they believe will not be true, to say the 
least. Precisely the best of the non-philosophers, the good citizens, are 
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passionately attached to these opinions and therefore passionately 
opposed to philosophy which is the attempt to go beyond opinion 
toward knowledge. (Strauss, 1978, p. 125) 
 
This seŶtiŵeŶt is eĐhoed iŶ “tƌauss͛ asseƌtioŶ that ͚uŶtƌue stoƌies aƌe Ŷeeded not only for little 
children but also for the grown-up citizens of the good city, but it is probably best if they are imbued 
with these stories from the earliest possible moment͛ ;“tƌauss, ϭϵϳϴ, p. ϵϴͿ. 
To mitigate the pernicious consequences of the abyss, then, ideas and opinion must be in 
constant circulation and reaffirmation for Strauss: ͚eǀeŶ a mass culture and precisely a mass culture 
requires a constant supply of what are called new ideas, which are the products of what are called 
creative minds: even singing commercials lose their appeal if they are not varied from time to tiŵe͛ 
;“tƌauss, ϭϵϵϱ, p. ϱͿ. Thus, he Đlaiŵs, ͚the good city is not possible without a fundamental falsehood; 
it cannot exist in the eleŵeŶt of tƌuth͛ ;“tƌauss, 1978, p. 102). The notion of justice is one such 
falsehood or myth for Strauss, which, as Lampert shows, can be seen in Strauss͛ ƌeadiŶg of the 
Republic: the latteƌ is ͚aŶ iƌoŶiĐ justifiĐatioŶ pƌecisely of the adikia (unjust) – that comes out 
ďeautifullǇ iŶ the ThƌasǇŵaĐhus disĐussioŶ͛, iŶ ǁhiĐh justiĐe ͚loses the tƌial, it wins only through the 
myth at the end, that is, through a kalon pseudo [beautiful lie], that is, through a deed that is strictly 
speakiŶg adikoŶ͛ ;ϮϬϬϵ, p. 71). In other words, as a consequence of the abyss, justice is exposed as a 
myth,a beautiful lie. Because no truth exists for Strauss in social science, philosophy or justice, 
opinion must operate in its place such that society may function. A process of generating and 
disseminating opinion can thus be seen to be a ĐeŶtƌal diŵeŶsioŶ of “tƌauss͛ thought. This is 
reflected in two telling features of “tƌauss͛ thought: the fƌieŶd/eŶeŵǇ ďiŶaƌǇ aŶd the rehabilitation 
of the notions of the ͚ƌegiŵe͛ aŶd ͚tǇƌaŶŶǇ͛. 
The conceptualisation of the friend/enemy binary is most frequently associated with the 
thought of Carl Schmitt, rather than with that of Leo Strauss. Significant ongoing debate exists 
regarding hoǁ “Đhŵitt͛s oeuǀƌe ŵight ďe read in an IR context, the friend/enemy binary residing at 
the very core of this. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to explore this in detail, a 
particularly interesting dimension of this is the division of opinion between those, on the one hand, 
ǁho ƌead “Đhŵitt͛s thought as intimately connected to fascist politics (Howse, 1998, 2003), and 
those, on the other, who read his existential decisionism as challenging the ontological totalisation 
of neo-liberal orthodoxy (Mouffe, 2007; Odysseos, 2007), in a manner that resembles, according to 
Prozorov (2007), a foƌŵ of ͚FouĐauldiaŶ ethiĐs͛.ϳ  
Entangled within this broader debate is the questioŶ of “tƌauss͛ ƌelatioŶship ǁith “Đhŵitt͛s 
thought, an issue that is itself subject to considerable disagreement. While Prozorov (2007) and 
Mouffe (2007) challenge the notion that “Đhŵitt͛s foƌŵulatioŶ ŵaps easilǇ oŶto “tƌauss͛ politiĐal 
philosophy, and thereby to Straussian foreign policy activities, Sheppard, for instance, argues that 
͚“tƌauss folloǁed “Đhŵitt in using his conception of the political to point out the inherent 
weaknesses and deficiencies of ŵodeƌŶ liďeƌalisŵ͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ, p. 66), his conception of the political 
understood as the Đlaiŵ that if ͚the distinction between friend and enemy ceases even as a mere 
possibility, there will be a politics-free weltanschauung, culture, civilisation, economy, morals, law, 
aƌt͛ ;“Đhŵitt, Đited iŶ Meieƌ, ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϭϯͿ. Although a thorough treatment of this debate cannot be 
offered here, my concern is to demonstrate the operation of the logic of a dichotomous 
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conceptualisation of friends and enemies iŶ “tƌauss͛ thought, aŶd this ĐaŶ ďe doŶe leaving aside the 
question of whether or not this emanates from Schmitt. 
Albeit rarely, if ever, stated directly in his own voice, the presence of this ďiŶaƌǇ iŶ “tƌauss͛ 
thought is discernible. It is appealed to, for instance, in his oďseƌǀatioŶ that the ĐitǇ ͚sepaƌates itself 
from others by opposing or resisting theŵ; the oppositioŶ of ͞We͟ aŶd ͞TheǇ͟ is esseŶtial to the 
political associatioŶ͛ (Strauss, 1978, p. 111). Similarly, he states that iŶ soĐietǇ, ͚the just ŵaŶ is he 
who does not harm, but loves, his friends and neighbors, i.e., his fellow citizens, but who does harm 
or who hates his enemies, i.e., the foreigners who as such are at least poteŶtial eŶeŵies of his ĐitǇ͛ 
(Strauss, 1965, p. 149).8 Robert Howse offers a particularly insightful account of “tƌauss͛ ƌelatioŶship 
with the friend/enemy binary. He claims that, for Strauss, ͚the politiĐal is Đoeǀal ǁith the 
friend/enemy distinction, for only this distinction seems capable of explaining or legitimizing the 
application of rules within society that are not applied to otheƌs oŶ the outside͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, he 
continues, “tƌauss͛ foƌŵulatioŶ also ͚laǇs bare the problematic character of the friend/enemy 
distinction from the perspective of pure natural right. It points to the limits of politics, to the tension 
between the demands of politics and the uŶƋualified good foƌ ŵaŶ͛ (1998, p. 80). Strauss, in this 
reading, both identifies and follows the logic of the friend/enemy binary, but also indicates its 
constructed and contingent nature, exposing, in a pseudo-deconstructive manner, at least for those 
able to see, its constituted rather than eternal nature. Thus, the logic of the friend/enemy binary can 
be seen to be at work in Strauss͛ thought. As ǁill ďe fuƌtheƌ demonstrated below, the operation of 
this dichotomy plays a crucial role in the generation of salutary opinions. 
In conjunction with this binary are two terms that run as Xenos notes (2008: xi), through 
“tƌauss͛ thought: the ĐoŶĐept of the ͚ƌegiŵe͛ aŶd the ƌelated ŶotioŶ of ͚tǇƌaŶŶǇ͛. Moƌe thaŶ siŵplǇ 
the ways in which the practical infrastructure of society is organised, the regime refers, for Strauss, 
to the modes of life within a society, the premises and values upon which society rests, the very 
foundations of society. Strauss states that foƌ the aŶĐieŶts, ͚the regiŵe is the ͞foƌŵ͟ of the ĐitǇ… 
[and] who is or is not a citizen depends alƌeadǇ oŶ the foƌŵ͛ ;ϭϵϳϴ, p. ϰϲͿ. He Đoŵments elsewhere: 
͚ǁhat it ŵeaŶs to be a good citizen depends entirely on the regime. A good citizen in Hitler͛s 
GeƌŵaŶǇ ǁould ďe a ďad ĐitizeŶ elseǁheƌe͛ (1973, p. 35). For Strauss, the citizen is fundamentally 
constituted in light of the regime; as Machiavelli shoǁed, ͚ǁhile ŵeŶ aƌe ďǇ Ŷatuƌe selfish, aŶd 
nothing but selfish, hence bad, they can become social, public spirited, or good. This transformation 
requires compulsion. The success of this compulsion is due to the fact that man is amazingly 
ŵalleaďle͛ ;“trauss, 1973, p. 42).9 The regime is thus crucial to the ways in which individuals and 
society are constituted, and plays a central ƌole iŶ the geŶeƌatioŶ of soĐietǇ͛s opiŶioŶs. Like the 
friend/enemy binary, and indeed reflecting its operation, it guards against descent into relativism by 
contributing to constituting society as something in particular. 
Part of how such a constitution can occur is the positioning the regime against an enemy 
ƌegiŵe. “tƌauss͛ use of the teƌŵ ͚tǇƌaŶŶǇ͛ fuŶĐtioŶs iŶ pƌeĐiselǇ this manner. He states: 
A social science that cannot speak of tyranny with the same confidence 
with which medicine speaks, for example, of cancer, cannot understand 
social pheŶoŵeŶa as ǁhat theǇ aƌe… Present day social science finds 
itself iŶ this ĐoŶditioŶ… Once we have learned again from the classics 
what tyranny is, we shall be enabled and compelled to diagnose as 
tyrannies a number of contemporary regimes which appear in the guise of 
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dictatorships. (Strauss, 1973, p. 95) 
 
Strauss thus explicitly endeavoured to rehabilitate the notion of tyranny in the context of foreign 
policy. As one Straussian noted, 
to the best of my recollection, in the political science of the 1930s neither 
Hitler nor Stalin was referred to as a tyrant. Their regimes were called 
dictatoƌships, oƌ totalitaƌiaŶ, iŶ defeƌeŶĐe to the Ƌuest foƌ ͚ǀalue fƌee͛ 
oďjeĐtiǀitǇ. Yet this ͚oďjeĐtiǀitǇ͛ ŵade it iŵpossiďle to uŶdeƌstaŶd 
the politiĐal ƌealitǇ. “tƌauss͛s OŶ TǇƌaŶŶy was written in part to restore  
the classical term and with it the classical understanding. (Jaffa, 
1999, p. 44) 
 
The notion of tyranny functions alongside the concept of the regime in order to desigŶate soĐietǇ͛s 
enemy in morally clear terms. It is thus closely related to “tƌauss͛ aǁaƌeŶess and mobilisation of the 
friend/enemy binary. These features of “tƌauss͛ thought haǀe iŵpoƌtaŶt iŵplications both for the 
study of contemporary US foreign policy and in the context of IR theory. 
 
Straussians and US Foreign Policy 
An exploration of the individuals and interventions that influenced the decision to invade Iraq is of 
crucial significance to contemporary IR scholarship, not least as a consequence of the leading roles 
played by the United States and United Kingdom in its undertaking and the ongoing devastation it 
has resulted in. Owing to the problems associated with the tendency to conflate Straussianism with 
neoconservatism more broadly, this article restricts itself to exploring the interventions of a small 
group of Straussian individuals active in this context.10 These are: William Kristol, Harvey Mansfield, 
Gary Schmitt, Abram Shulsky, Harry Jaffa and Paul Wolfowitz.11 These Straussians occupied various 
influential positions during the period immediately before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Kristol chaired 
the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and serves as editor of the Weekly Standard; 
Mansfield is William R. Kenan, Jr Professor of Government at Harvard and received a National 
Humanities Medal from President Bush in 2004; Schmitt ran PNAC as its Executive Director; Shulsky 
headed the controversial Office of Special Plans (OSP); Jaffa is Professor Emeritus of Government at 
the Claremont Graduate School and Distinguished Fellow at the Claremont Institute; and Wolfowitz 
served as Deputy Defense Secretary. These Straussians inherit from Strauss a sense of the 
constituted nature of social opinions and the imperative to generate and disseminate these such 
that society may cohere. Their interventions in the spheres of intelligence production, the media and 
thiŶk taŶks folloǁ “tƌauss͛ logic of generating opinion, reflect his emphasis on the friend/enemy 
binary, aŶd ŵoďilise the teƌŵs ͚ƌegiŵe͛ aŶd tǇƌaŶŶǇ͛ eǆteŶsiǀelǇ. 
 
Straussians and intelligence production: Rejecting objectivity; creating reality 
Shulsky, Schmitt and Wolfowitz were highly active in the sphere of intelligence production during 
the period in question, and indeed for many years before this.12 Their interventions in this sphere 
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follow the logiĐ of “tƌauss͛ positioŶ that objectivity cannot be possible given conditions of 
foundationlessness; they advocated and engendered changes in intelligence praxis that clearly 
reflect “tƌauss͛ thought. 
Traditionally, the intelligence community had operated from the assumption that its 
practices could lead to objective conclusions. This theoretical premise was derived in large part from 
the ideas and practice of Sherman Kent, a Yale Professor who served in the CIA during World War II 
and for 17 years during the Cold War. According to Peter Boyer, Wolfowitz was sceptical of these 
ŵethodologiĐal assuŵptioŶs: he had ͚deep and abiding suspicions about the inviolability of the 
iŶtelligeŶĐe ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛s Đulture and processes, a scepticism that dates back to his earliest days in 
government seƌǀiĐe͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ, p. 4). This was because, Shulsky notes, these assumptions reflect 
the tremendous optimism of the social sciences of the 1940s aŶd ϭϵϱϬs… 
that the new methodology of social science would begin to bear fruit and 
result in a much more scientific understanding of huŵaŶ ďehaǀiouƌ… on 
the model of the physical sciences. (1995, p. 20) 
 
This ďelief ĐaŶŶot, foƌ “hulskǇ, ďe sustaiŶed: ͚ ͞sĐieŶtifiĐ͟ soĐial sĐieŶĐe is much more problematic 
[than it seems] and y the model of the physical sciences is not applicable. This͛, he ĐoŶtiŶues, 
͚uŶdeƌĐuts KeŶt͛s ďelief iŶ intelligence as universal social science and forces us back to the main 
issue of how the information needs of a government should ďe ŵet͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ, p. ϮϬͿ. The question 
remaining if objectivity is impossible is, then, for Shulsky, meeting the needs of policy makers. 
“tƌauss͛ iŶflueŶĐe is Đlearly discernable here; Schmitt aŶd “hulskǇ Ŷote that ͚the tƌeŶds iŶ politiĐal 
sĐieŶĐe that “tƌauss poleŵisized agaiŶst… also affected the world of iŶtelligeŶĐe͛ ;ϭϵϵϵ, p. ϰϬϳͿ. 
Shulsky and Schmitt propose two changes to intelligence production methodology. First, they insist 
that the focusing on the particularities of the nation being studied must be central to intelligence 
production: 
ŶatioŶal seĐuƌitǇ… cannot be considered indepeŶdeŶtlǇ of the ŶatioŶ͛s 
type of government (or regime) and its ideological outlook. Although 
adheƌeŶts of ‘ealpolitik ǁould aƌgue that a ŶatioŶ͛s iŶteƌests aƌe deteƌŵiŶed 
by the objective factors of the international system, ideological 
view, and a ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s politiĐal Đultuƌe ŵoƌe geŶeƌallǇ, affeĐt hoǁ a 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt peƌĐeiǀes theŵ. Foƌ eǆaŵple, a ƌegiŵe͛s ideologiĐal 
character may determine whether or not it views a given foreign country 
as a threat. (1995, p. 3) 
 
The pƌeseŶĐe of the ĐoŶĐept of the ͚ƌegiŵe͛ is highlǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt heƌe; it echoes “tƌauss͛ ideŶtifiĐatioŶ 
and use of the term as noted above. Second, they argue that intelligence production must be more 
closely guided by policy makers. In ShulskǇ aŶd “Đhŵitt͛s ǁoƌds, 
having some collection capability under the control of policy-makers 
with specific needs, such as the military, is likely to make the resulting 
intelligence ŵoƌe ƌeleǀaŶt… [C]loseness to policymakers, despite the 
thƌeat to ͚oďjeĐtiǀitǇ͛ that eŶtails, ŵakes seŶse if it gƌouŶds the analysts in 
concern for concrete policy issues that must be addressed in instrumentally 
useful ways. (2002, pp. 50–54) 
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“iŵilaƌlǇ, Wolfoǁitz aƌgues that ͚the poliĐǇ pƌoĐess should dƌiǀe iŶtelligence pƌoduĐtioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ, p. 
75). 
During the period leading up to the invasion of Iraq, these Straussiansoccupied highly 
influential positions within the intelligence community. In October 2001, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld 
established the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, although this was kept secret for more 
than a year (Lang, 2004). Simultaneously, the structure of the Iraq Desk at Near East and South Asian 
Affairs was abruptly changed and this resulted in the creation of a new entity, the OSP, during late 
summer 2002. This agency was dedicated to exploring the possible connections between 9/11 and 
“addaŵ HusseiŶ͛s Iraq.13 
Intelligence production at the OSP was conducted in ways that reflect Wolfowitz, Shulsky 
aŶd “Đhŵitt͛s pƌesĐƌiptions for reform mentioned above; practices central to the Kentian model 
were suspended and political interests played a central role. As a former National Security Council 
expert on Iraq has aƌgued, the O“P ͚disŵaŶtle[d] the eǆistiŶg filteƌing process that for fifty years had 
been preventing the policymakers from gettiŶg ďad iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛ ;PollaĐk, cited in Hersh, 2005, p. 
223). During this period, the OSP sidestepped practices of peer review, the verification of material by 
comparison with other existing information, and other traditional procedures designed to ensure 
that only reliable information reached policy makers.14 This process became known as ͚stoǀepipiŶg͛. 
Stovepiping refers to the direct feeding of unsubstantiated information straight to the 
highest levels of the political establishment. In Gordon MitĐhell͛s ǁoƌds, ͚this tƌaŶsŵissioŶ oĐĐuƌs 
through channels that circumvent institutionalised vetting procedures used to validate and 
coordinate intelligence assessments amongst the intelligence comŵuŶitǇ͛s Ŷuŵeƌous iŶstitutioŶal 
entities producing official ƌepoƌtiŶg͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ, p. 15). This shift in verification procedures was defended 
by Wolfowitz: 
we must accelerate the speed with which information is passed to policy 
makers and operators. We cannot wait for critical intelligence to be 
processed, coordinated, edited and approved – we must accept the risks 
inherent in posting critical information before it is processed. (cited in 
Mitchell, 2006, p. 15) 
 
This coincides closely with these StraussiaŶs͛ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to ĐoŶduĐtiŶg intelligence production 
with the aims of policy makers in mind. 
There were at least two major disagreements between the OSP and the CIA/DIA during this 
period, namely the question of a connection between the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein, and the 
issue of the latteƌ͛s possessioŶ of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although Admiral Bob 
Inman, a former Deputy Director of the CIA, submitted that ͚theƌe ǁas Ŷo tie ďetǁeeŶ Iraq and 9/11, 
even though some people tried to postulate oŶe… I know of no instance in which Iraq funded direct, 
deliberate attaĐks oŶ the UŶited “tates͛ (cited in Lang, 2004), the OSP insisted that such a 
connection did exist. Similarly, 
CIA analysts also generally endorsed the findings of the International 
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AtoŵiĐ EŶeƌgǇ AgeŶĐǇ ;IAEAͿ, ǁhiĐh ĐoŶĐluded that Ǉ[IƌaƋ͛s] pƌeseŶt 
capabilities were virtually nil. The IAEA possessed no evidence that Iraq 
was reconstituting its nuclear program and, it seems, neither did US 
iŶtelligeŶĐe. IŶ CIA DiƌeĐtoƌ Geoƌge TeŶet͛s JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬϬϮ ƌeǀieǁ of 
global weapons-technology proliferation, he did not even mention a 
nuclear threat from Iraq. (Ackerman and Judis, 2003) 
 
In contrast, the OSP insisted that Saddam Hussein had these at his disposal. 
These Đlaiŵs ǁeƌe Đodified iŶ a seƌies of ͚talkiŶg poiŶts͛ pƌoduĐed at the OSP. These talking 
points weƌe ͚a seƌies of bulleted statements, written persuasively and in a convincing way, and 
superficially they seemed reasonable aŶd ƌatioŶal͛ ;Kǁiatkoǁski, ϮϬϬϰͿ. These poiŶts ͚ǁeƌe to ďe the 
only briefings pƌoǀided oŶ IƌaƋ͛ ;LaŶg, ϮϬϬϰͿ. TheǇ eŵphasised that ͚“addaŵ HusseiŶ has gassed his 
neighbors, abused his people, and was continuing in that mode, becoming an imminently dangerous 
threat to his Ŷeighďoƌs aŶd to us͛, that ͚“addaŵ HusseiŶ had haƌďouƌed al-Qaida operatives and 
offered and probably provided them with training facilities – without mentioning that the suspected 
facilities were in the US/Kurdish-controlled paƌt of IƌaƋ͛, aŶd that ͚“addaŵ Hussein was pursuing and 
had WMD of the type that could be used by him, in conjunction with al-Qaida and other terrorists, to 
attack and damage American interests, Americans and AŵeƌiĐa͛. TheǇ ĐoŶĐluded that  
Saddam Hussein had not been seriously weakened by war and sanctions and weekly 
bombings over the past 12 years, and in fact was plotting to hurt America and support anti-
American activities, in part through his carrying on with terrorists – although here the 
intelligence said the opposite. (Kwiatkowski, 2004) 
All of this led Kwiatkowski to reflect that, 
with the talking points, many of the propagandistic bullets that [we] were 
given to use in papers for our superiors to inform them – internal 
propaganda – many of those same phrases and assumptions and tones, 
I saǁ iŶ ViĐe PƌesideŶt CheŶeǇ͛s speeĐhes aŶd the pƌesideŶt͛s speeĐhes. 
So I got the impression that those talking points were not just for us, but 
were the core of an overall agenda for a disciplined product, beyond the 
PeŶtagoŶ. Oǀeƌ at the ǀiĐe pƌesideŶt͛s offiĐe aŶd the WeeklǇ “taŶdaƌd, 
the media, and the neoconservative talking heads and that kind of thing, 
all on the same sheet of music. (cited in Lang, 2004)15 
 
Kwiatkowski claims that the talking points were only distributed following ͚“hulskǇ͛s appƌoǀal͛, aŶd 
the modifications that occurred over time were ͚diƌeĐted oƌ appƌoǀed ďǇ “hulskǇ aŶd his teaŵ͛ 
(Kǁiatkoǁski, ϮϬϬϰͿ. IŶ LaŶg͛s estiŵatioŶ, ͚“hulskǇ seeŵs to haǀe set out to use the OSP as the 
means for providing the Bush administration policymakers all the ammunition they needed to get 
theiƌ desiƌed ƌesults͛ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ. This is ĐoŶsistent with these StraussiaŶs͛ agenda of a policy-driven 
intelligence production process and represents a suspeŶsioŶ of the KeŶtiaŶ ŵethods as “tƌauss͛ 
rejection of positivism implies. As “hulskǇ ƌeiteƌates, ͚ǁhǇ fight it out oŶ poliĐǇ gƌouŶds if one can 
win by manipulating the intelligence product and arrogating its auƌa foƌ oŶe͛s positioŶ?͛ (1995, p. 
ϮϳͿ. Thus, “tƌauss͛ thought ĐaŶ ĐleaƌlǇ ďe disĐeƌŶed iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of intelligence production. 
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Straussians and the Media: Making manifest friends and enemies 
In conjunction with their activities in the sphere of intelligence production, these Straussians 
enacted concurrent interventions in the media that reflect“tƌauss͛ thought. IŶ this ĐoŶteǆt iŶ 
particular, the friend/enemy binary aŶd the ŶotioŶs of the ͚ƌegiŵe͛ aŶd ͚tǇƌaŶŶǇ͛ aƌe clearly in 
evidence. Kristol was particularly visible in media during this period, publishing regularly in the 
Weekly Standard, as well as appearing regularly on Fox and MSNBC (Halper and Clarke, 2004, p. 
188), and on Good Morning America, The Week with David Brinkley and The NewsHour with Jim 
Lehrer (Dorrien, 2004a, p. 126). Mansfield, Wolfowitz, Schmitt and Jaffa were also active in this 
sphere. 
Just as the Straussians in the realm of intelligence production had propounded a version of 
events that divided the world into friends and enemies, so too did the Straussians in the media. As 
Mansfield ĐoŵŵeŶted, ͚these people are not just others whom we can understand if we look hard at 
them and see that uŶdeƌŶeath theŵ theǇ͛ƌe ƌeallǇ like us. No, theǇ͛ƌe diffeƌent from us. TheǇ͛ƌe ouƌ 
eŶeŵies͛ ;MaŶsfield, ϮϬϬϮͿ. This ͚eŶeŵǇ͛ ǁas Đoŵpƌised, these Straussians insisted, of an 
amalgamation of Saddam Hussein, terrorists and WMD; indeed Kristol claimed a connection 
between Iraq and terrorism existed on the evening of 9/11 itself: 
I think Iraq is, actually, the big, unspoken sort of elephant in the room 
todaǇ. Theƌe͛s a faiƌ aŵouŶt of eǀideŶĐe that IƌaƋ has had ǀeƌǇ Đlose 
associations with Osama bin Laden in the past, a lot of evidence that it 
had associations with the previous effort to destroy the World Trade 
Centre [in 1993]. (cited in Lobe, 2003) 
 
During the period of the establishment of the OSP and its intelligence production activities, Kristol 
placed a strong emphasis on the dangers of the combined threats posed by Iraq, terrorism and 
WMD in the Weekly Standard. IŶ oŶe aƌtiĐle, he aƌgued that ͚IƌaƋ is the thƌeat and the supreme test 
of whether we as a nation have learned the lesson of “epteŵďeƌ ϭϭ͛. He ĐoŶtiŶues,  
but after September 11, we have all been forced to consider another scenario. What if 
Saddam provides some of his anthrax, or his XV, or a nuclear device to a terrorist group like 
al Qaeda? Saddam could help a terrorist inflict a horrific attack on the United States or its 
allies… To this daǇ ǁe doŶ͛t know who provided the anthrax for the post-September 11 
attacks. We may never know for sure. (Kagan and Kristol, 2002) 
Wolfowitz also contributed to disseminating the connection in the public 
realm: 
our successes in recent months in capturing terrorists demonstrate clearly 
that the effort we have mobilized at the same time to disarm Iraq of its 
weapons of mass terror has not distracted us from the hunt for al Qaeda. 
But make no mistake; these are not two separate issues. Disarming 
“addaŵ͛s ǁeapoŶs of ŵass terror is a second front in the war on terrorism. 
(cited in Rhem, 2003) 
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As well as his concurrence with Kristol that the issues were not separate, what is especially 
ŶoteǁoƌthǇ heƌe is Wolfoǁitz͛s use of the Ŷeǁ teƌŵ ͚ǁeapoŶs of ŵass teƌƌoƌ͛ as a suďstitute for the 
usual ͚ǁeapoŶs of ŵass destƌuĐtioŶ͛. That opinion is malleable and ideas productive is demonstrated 
here; this Straussian attempt to conceptually conjoin dispaƌate ŶotioŶs ƌefleĐts “tƌauss͛ thought. 
In addition to the development of particular conceptualisations of an enemy figure, these 
“tƌaussiaŶs͛ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs in the media are riddled with distinctively Straussian terminologies, 
namely the teƌŵs ͚ƌegiŵe͛ aŶd ͚tǇƌaŶŶǇ͛. Following the 9/11 attacks, the question of removing 
“addaŵ HusseiŶ͛s regime, as well as linguistically connecting him with the Taliban is in evidence: 
Ousting Saddam, like ousting the Taliban, is only the first step in a long process. Everyone knows we 
can remove an evil regime. The question is, are we willing to expend the security, financial, 
diplomatic, and political resources to make the successor regime a success. (Wolfowitz, 2002, p. 3)  
Mansfield also emphasises the connection by invoking the notion of the regime, claiming 
aďout iŶǀasioŶ of IƌaƋ that the ͚ ͞ǁaƌ oŶ teƌƌoƌ͟ and this war are one and the same. We should 
certainly pursue those regimes that use terrorism as ǁell as the aĐtual teƌƌoƌists theŵselǀes͛ ;Đited 
in Turner, 2003). Jaffa also utilised the term, asking in relation to Saddam HusseiŶ͛s aĐƋuisitioŶ of ϵϵ 
per ĐeŶt of the ǀote iŶ the IƌaƋ eleĐtioŶs, ͚does that make his regime any less tǇƌaŶŶiĐal?͛ ;ϮϬϬϯͿ. 
As this shows, the notion of tyranny was also mobilised. A month after the attacks, for 
iŶstaŶĐe, “Đhŵitt aƌgued that ͚the Iraqi dictator has made it known tiŵe aŶd agaiŶ that the ͞ŵotheƌ 
of all ďattles͟ Đontinues. And, like all tyrants of his maniacal stripe, he seeks not only to hold onto 
power but to claim a plaĐe iŶ histoƌǇ͛ ;“Đhŵitt, ϮϬϬϭͿ. “iŵilaƌlǇ, Kƌistol Ŷoted that the ͚Aƌaď ǁoƌld 
may take a long time coming to terms with the West, but that process will be hastened by the defeat 
of the leading anti-westeƌŶ tǇƌaŶt͛ ;KagaŶ aŶd Kƌistol, 2002). 
Importantly, these terms had significant productive effects. The figure of the ͚ƌegiŵe͛ 
became highly visible in the context a central narrative surrounding IƌaƋ, ŶaŵelǇ ͚ƌegiŵe ĐhaŶge͛. 
Tellingly, Kristol Ŷoted this: ͚PƌesideŶt Bush͛s adǀoĐaĐǇ of ͞ƌegiŵe ĐhaŶge͟… is a not altogether 
unworthy product of “tƌauss͛ ƌehaďilitatioŶ of the ŶotioŶ of ƌegiŵe͛ ;LeŶzŶeƌ aŶd Kristol, 2003). 
Similarly, the notion of tyranny was applied extensively, and may have occupied an even more 
central rhetoric role if the pƌoposed ͚Waƌ oŶ TǇƌaŶŶǇ͛, which was called for to replace the War on 
Terror (Engdahl, 2005), had taken hold. This is not to suggest that these Straussians enjoyed a 
monopoly on the use of these terms, nor that they were the only people to employ them. Rather, it 
can be seen that these Straussians in the media acted consistently with “tƌauss͛ thought iŶ 
emphasising the notion of an enemy and making extensive use of the teƌŵs ͚ƌegiŵe͛ aŶd ͚tǇƌaŶŶǇ͛. 
 
“tƌaussiaŶs aŶd thiŶk taŶks: ͚LeadiŶg͛ soĐial opiŶioŶ 
These Straussians were also active in a variety of think tanks during the period in question. Although 
their various affiliations are also worthy of consideration,16 of particular significance here is PNAC. 
PNAC was founded by Kristol, along with Robert Kagan, in 1997, and Schmitt was its Executive 
DiƌeĐtoƌ. Wolfoǁitz ǁas also a ŵeŵďeƌ. PNAC͛s aĐtivities attracted considerable attention during 
this period, not least as a consequence of the open letters it sent to President Bush. In a similar 
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manner to the Straussians active in the intelligence community and the media, the Straussians 
involved in PNAC endeavoured to emphasise the presence of an enemy and a connectionbetween 
Saddam Hussein and 9/11. In one letter, the signatories urged the President 
to accelerate plans for removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. As 
you have said, every day that Saddam Hussein remains in power brings 
closer the day the terrorists will have not just airplanes with which to 
attack us, but chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, as well. (PNAC, 
2002) 
 
In another such letter, the signatories stated: 
it may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to 
the recent attack on the United States. But even if evidence does not link 
Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of 
terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. (PNAC, 2001) 
 
Here, the signatories argue that Iraq ought to be targeted and Saddam Hussein removed even in the 
absence of any evidence linking him to the 9/11 attacks. This might suggest that the need for proof 
was not a primary concern for these Straussians at this stage; they were keen to proceed with an 
invasion without it. That evidence was not a vital condition for these Straussians should come as no 
surprise in light of the politicisation of intelligence explored above. 
In conjunction with these letters, Kristol disseminated a series of PNAC internal memoranda 
to his colleagues during this period. The content of these reflects the agenda outlined here, but of 
particular significance is that the recipieŶts aƌe ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚opiŶioŶ leadeƌs͛ iŶ eaĐh. This seeŵs to 
echo “tƌauss͛ foĐus oŶ the geŶeƌatioŶ of salutaƌǇ opinions; Straussians referring to one another as 
opinion leaders appears to refleĐt “tƌauss͛ iŵpeƌatiǀe that opinions be generated and disseminated 
opinion in society.  
PNAC͛s offiĐes Đlosed iŶ ϮϬϬϲ. GaƌǇ “Đhŵitt ĐoŵŵeŶted that Ǉeaƌ: ͚ǁheŶ the project started, 
it was not intended to go forever. That is why we are shutting it down. We would have had to spend 
too much time raising money foƌ it͛. He continues, significantly, that anyway ͚it has alƌeadǇ doŶe its 
joď… Ouƌ ǀieǁ has ďeeŶ adopted͛ ;Đited iŶ ‘eǇŶolds, ϮϬϬϲͿ. That PNAC͛s ͚joď͛ ǁas to ensure the 
adoptioŶ of its ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ǀieǁs is ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith “tƌauss͛ emphasis on the production of social 
opinion.  
Thus, several distinctively Straussian ideas and premises can be perceived in the 
iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs of these “tƌaussiaŶs. “tƌauss͛ rejection of the possibility of objectivity is reflected in 
their activities relating to intelligence production; his explicit intention to rehabilitate the notions of 
the regime and tyranny is ŵiƌƌoƌed ďǇ these “tƌaussiaŶs͛ ĐoŶtiŶuous ŵoďilisation of these terms; 
and his emphasis on the friend/enemy binary is shown across these spheres. An intellectual heritage 
can, consequently, be traĐed ďetǁeeŶ “tƌauss͛ politiĐal philosophǇ aŶd these “tƌaussiaŶs͛ aĐtiǀities 
leading up to the invasion of Iraq, issues key to the study of contemporary US foreign policy. 
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Strauss and IR Theory 
As ǁell as the sigŶifiĐaŶĐe of “tƌauss͛ thought in the context of the invasion of Iraq, it also has 
important connotations in the context of contemporary IR theoƌǇ. “tƌauss͛ pƌeoĐĐupatioŶ ǁith the 
abyss underpinning Western philosophy and society reflects the ongoing debates regarding 
methodological, epistemological and ontological assumptions that have been central to the so-called 
Fourth Great Debate in IR. The question of the foundations upon which claims might be made is an 
issue that resides as the heart of the debate between traditional and critical theorists. Traditional 
theorists have charged that critical scholars have endangered the premises upon which IR 
scholarship depends; ‘oďeƌt KeohaŶe, foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, oďjeĐts ͚to the notion that we should happily 
accept the existence of multiple incommensurable epistemologies, each equally valid. Such a view 
seems to me to lead away from our knowledge of the external world, and ultimately to a sort of 
Ŷihilisŵ͛ ;ϭϵϴϵ, p. ϮϰϵͿ. He ĐoŶtiŶues: 
I fear that many feminist theorists of international relations may follow 
the currently fashionable path of fragmenting epistemology, denying the 
possibility of social science. But I think this would be an intellectual and 
ŵoƌal disasteƌ… [ďeĐause] ͚iŶ a ǁoƌld of ƌadiĐal iŶeƋualitǇ, ƌelatiǀist 
resignation reinforces the status Ƌuo͛. ;ϭϵϴϵ, p. ϮϱϬͿ 
 
For Keohane, such a problematisation of epistemology appears to lead to a situation wherein 
morality and knowledge perish, to a relativist space wherein one is resigned to the status quo. This is 
because, as David Campbell notes, 
͚eŶd of philosophǇ͛ – the problematic turn that signifies, among other 
developments, the Heideggerian critique of metaphysics and its many 
offspring – appears to pose something of a hurdle for thinking through 
the ethical challenges of our era. Not least of these obstacles is the view 
that in the wake of the Heideggerian critique, the ground for moral 
theory has been removed, because the ethos of moral philosophy cannot 
remain once the logos of metaphysics has gone. (1999, p. 30) 
 
Apprehension of this kind is also in evidenĐe iŶ KeŶ Booth͛s iŶǀoĐatioŶ of ‘iĐhaƌd A. WilsoŶ͛s 
aŶalogǇ: ͚‘ights ǁithout a metanarrative are like a car without seat-belts; on hitting the first bump 
with ontological implications, the passeŶgeƌ͛s safetǇ is jeopaƌdised͛ ;ϮϬϬϱ, p. 270). Here, the 
problematisation of oŶtologǇ is Ŷoted foƌ uŶdeƌŵiŶiŶg the ͚safetǇ͛ of those ǁishiŶg to eŶgage iŶ 
knowledge claims. In this account, although a fixed or stable set of ontological premises would serve 
to secure the subject, disrupting or undermining these renders him/her manifestly unsafe. The fear 
associated with this lack of safety seems to be related to the possibility of knowledge and 
judgement. As Booth Ŷotes elseǁheƌe, suĐh thought ͚offeƌs Ŷo esĐape fƌoŵ ŵight is ƌight͛ ;ϭϵϵϭ, p. 
316). 
This ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁith the logiĐ of ͚ŵight is ƌight͛ ƌelates to the ƋuestioŶ of the rise of far-right 
politics in the twentieth century. As Campbell notes, such thought has pƌoŵpted a ͚ƌaŶge of 
concerns – the German Historikerstreit, the wartime writings of Paul de Man, and various attempts 
at Holocaust revisionism, aloŶg ǁith Heideggeƌ͛s oǁŶ Nazi affiliations – that many take to be proof 
of the dangers that post-metaphysical thiŶkiŶg poƌteŶds͛ ;ϭϵϵϵ, p. ϯϬͿ. These concerns reside at the 
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heaƌt of “tƌauss͛ political philosophy. Strauss was so profoundly troubled by Heidegger because he 
read the latter as having ĐoŶĐluded that ͚ethiĐs is iŵpossiďle, aŶd his ǁhole being was permeated by 
the awareness that this fact opens up an abyss (Strauss, 1989, p. 28). Strauss was disturbed by the 
relationship he perceived between the Nietzschean/Heideggerian destabilisation of metaphysics and 
the rise of Nazism; for Strauss, the ͚paƌtiĐulaƌ hoƌƌoƌ of ŵodeƌŶ tǇƌaŶŶǇ has ďeen its alliance with 
perverted philosophǇ͛ ;Blooŵ, ϭϵϳϰ, p. 388). 
The risk, as Strauss saw it, was that in the absence of fixed moral standards, no boundaries 
or barriers exist to curb the worst excesses of human behaviour: Heidegger became a Nazi in 1933. 
This was not due to a mere error of judgement on the part of a man who lived on great heights high 
above the low land of politics. Everyone who had read his first great book and did not overlook the 
wood for the trees could see the kinship in temper and diƌeĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ Heideggeƌ͛s thought aŶd 
the Nazis. (Strauss, 1989, p. 30) 
“tƌauss also looks fuƌtheƌ ďaĐk, to NietzsĐhe, ĐlaiŵiŶg that the ͚Đase of Heidegger reminds 
one to a certain extent of the case of Nietzsche. Nietzsche, naturally, would not have sided with 
Hitler. Yet there is an undeniable kinship betweeŶ NietzsĐhe͛s thought aŶd fasĐisŵ͛ ;“tƌauss, 1989, p. 
31). In short, for Strauss, as for Keohane and Booth, undermining epistemological or ontological 
foundations means that values and moral premises cannot be securely held, and this means that 
there is no protection against the rise of fascism, the supposed political culmination of nihilism. The 
exposure of the abyss, in this account, paves the way for the related evils of despair and Nazism.  
“tƌauss͛ uŶdeƌlǇiŶg pƌojeĐt ĐaŶ ďe ƌead as an attempt to offset the dangers associated with 
the destabilisation of the foundations upon which philosophy and society had hitherto rested. As 
such, it may be hoped that it could have purchase in assuaging the concerns raised by Keohane and 
Booth. The exposure of the abyss leads, for Strauss, to conditions wherein values become relative 
and the reason of the strongest prevails, and he consequently endorses the generation and 
dissemination of socially salutary opinions in order that society may be rendered safe from these 
dangers. However, the interventions of the Straussians discussed here highlight a problem with this 
solution. The political outcome of the process of opinion formation proposed by Strauss has at its 
Đoƌe pƌeĐiselǇ the logiĐ of ͚ŵight is ƌight͛ that Booth fears; these Straussians generated ideas about 
the relationship between 9/11, Iraq and WMD in accordance with their political agenda, and 
successfully instantiated this in the popular consciousness. This conforms to the logic of the 
domination of the strongest that Booth identifies; the Straussian discourse prevailed over competing 
claims and accounts in the fields of intelligence production, think tanks and the media for reasons 
other than their intrinsic plausibility, such that their account became the dominant opinion. 
Thus although “tƌauss atteŵpts to aǀoid ĐoŶditioŶs ǁheƌeiŶ ͚ŵight is ƌight͛ by generating 
socially salutary opinions, his thought reflects precisely this teŶdeŶĐǇ. “tƌauss͛ atteŵpt to offset this 
logic by avoiding nihilism through the generation of opinion was thus not successful; in advocating 
the generation of salutary opinions by those occupying positions of power, he ensured the 
perpetuation of the logic of the domination of the strongest. The salutary options developed and 
disseminated in the service of particular political ends amount precisely to a politics following the 
logiĐ of ͚ŵight is ƌight͛. This ŵight suggest that “tƌauss͛ atteŵpt to geŶeƌate suďstitute foundations 
to secure the modern condition against the dangers of nihilism cannot assuage the concerns raised 
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by Keohane and Booth; the generation of opinions as substitute foundations can only lead back to 
the totalising political outcomes they seek to avoid. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The political philosophy of Leo Strauss is thus of import in IR in the context of the study of both 
contemporary US foreign policy and IR theory. In the fiƌst Đase, the “tƌaussiaŶs͛ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs in 
intelligence production, the ŵedia aŶd thiŶk taŶks ƌefleĐt “tƌauss͛ thought in several crucial ways, 
namely the impossibility of objectivity in the foundationless modern condition, the operation of the 
friend/enemy binary, the rehabilitation of the notions of regime and tyranny, and the generation 
and dissemination of socially salutary opinions in order that society might avoid a descent into 
relativism and nihilism. While I do not claim that the Straussians were the only group intent on 
realising the invasion of Iraq, nor that the individuals discussed here were not motivated by issues 
other than their Straussian worldview, the ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ “tƌauss͛ thought aŶd the activities 
of Straussians within and close to the political establishment amounts to an important layer of 
analysis relating to the broader issue of the invasion, and reposes enduring questions about the 
relationship between philosophical traditions and political praxis. 
CoŶĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ, “tƌauss͛ thought ĐaŶ ďe ƌead as a ƌespoŶse to, aŶd aŶ atteŵpt to offset, the 
dangers he associated with the exposure of the foundationlessness of the modern condition. His 
advocation of the generation and dissemination of socially salutary opinions as a means by which to 
counter the onset of relativism and nihilism appears to amount to an attempt to challenge the logic 
of ͚ŵight is ƌight͛, ǁhiĐh is ƌisked, foƌ “tƌauss, ǁhen such foundations are undermined. However, 
“tƌauss͛ pƌojeĐt of opinion construction recreates eǆaĐtlǇ the logiĐ of ͚ŵight is ƌight͛ he appeaƌs to 
have been at pains to resist; by generating salutary opinions that masquerade as truth, a project of 
ontological totalisation occurs. This has important political implications: as Emmanuel Levinas notes, 
͚politiĐal totalitaƌiaŶisŵ ƌests oŶ oŶtologiĐal totalitaƌiaŶisŵ͛ (Levinas, 1990, p. 206). Such a 
relationship poses vital questions for those in IR engaged with the problem of theoretical 
foundations; if a self-conscious generation of opinion risks bringing about a totalising politics 
through the logic of the domination of the strongest, such a process does not address the concerns 
raised by Keohane or Booth, or indeed Strauss, regarding the desire to secure the subject against the 
supposed relativistic or nihilistic dangers of the abyss. On the contrary, it brings about precisely the 
logiĐ of ͚ŵight is ƌight͛ that they identify as the terrible consequence of the exposure of the abyss. 
This suggests that it is not in itself, as Strauss, Keohane or Booth claim, the destabilisation of 
metaphysical foundations that leads to totalising politics following the logic of the domination of the 
strongest. It is, rather, precisely the attempt to secure against such foundationlessness by imposing 
(pseudo-)ontological categories or principles that leads directly to such politics. 
This may suggest that while projects of opinion construction cannot challenge the logic of 
͚ŵight is ƌight͛, a deĐoŶstƌuĐtive approach that, while still proffering active and productive projects 
of political praxis, perpetually disrupts and resists the instantiation of any such project as final or 
given, may prove more fruitful in this context. This is because such a project restlessly intervenes to 
prevent the ontological totalisation that is the condition of possibility of political totalisation of the 
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kind generated by the Straussian construction of socially salutary opinions. In short, if the 
movements of deconstruction can resist the ontological totalisation that is the condition of 
possibility of political totalisation, it may be better placed to challenge the logic of ͚ŵight is ƌight͛ 
than alternative processes of construction that reproduce the problem of ontological totalisation. 
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Notes 
1 The play, entitled Embedded, was written and directed by Tim Robbins, and was staged in Los 
Angeles, New York, London, Chicago and elsewhere. It featured parodies of members of 
Bush͛s ǁaƌ ĐaďiŶet ĐhaŶtiŶg aŶd pƌoĐlaiŵiŶg theiƌ allegiaŶĐe to “tƌauss ;see MiŶoǁitz, ϮϬϬϵ, 
p. 20). 
2 The documentary, The Power of Nightmares, was written and directed by Adam Curtis and enjoyed 
a good deal of publicity, including a screening at the Cannes Film Festival in 2005. 
ϯ He ĐoŶtiŶues: ͚it is eƋuallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt Ŷot to oǀeƌ-estimate the influence or the specificity of the 
“tƌaussiaŶ positioŶ… [because] the roots of neoconservatism are broader than Straussian 
philosophǇ aloŶe͛. 
4 Such a conflatioŶ is deŵoŶstƌated, foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, iŶ Jiŵ Geoƌge͛s ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͚“tƌaussiaŶ 
inspired neo-ĐoŶseƌǀatiǀes͛ ;ϮϬϬϱ, p. ϭϳϰͿ. 
5 Whetheƌ oƌ Ŷot suĐh a sustaiŶed eŶgageŵeŶt ǁith “tƌauss͛ political philosophy is the necessary 
condition for inclusion in the categoƌǇ ͚“tƌaussiaŶ͛, oƌ iŶdeed the only or principle means by which 
Straussian influence is possible, is itself an important question. I would submit that the 
dissemination of Straussian ideas has been pervasive in ways other than direct engagement with his 
writings; as the article will show, textual study is by no means the oŶlǇ ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh “tƌauss͛ ideas 
have been in circulation within the neo-con movement and beyond. However, claiming such indirect 
influence remains highly contentious, and the surrounding difficulties adequately demonstrating it 
are frequently appealed to as part of rebuttals on the part of those sympathetic to Strauss and the 
Straussians. This is part of the reason why this article restricts itself to a focus on those who can 
more directly be said to have been influenced by Strauss and be shown to operate in light of his 
teachings. 
ϲ Foƌ a fulleƌ eǆploƌatioŶ aŶd defeŶĐe of this Đlaiŵ ƌegaƌdiŶg “tƌauss͛ ĐoŶĐeptualisatioŶ of justiĐe, 
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see Aggie Hirst (forthcoming). For a sense of how centrally this conceptualisation resides in the 
“tƌaussiaŶ ǁoƌldǀieǁ, see the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ to HaƌƌǇ Jaffa͛s iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ to Cƌisis of the House 
Diǀided, iŶ ǁhiĐh he states that it ǁas ͚Ŷot ŵeaŶt to ďe a ďook aďout AŵeƌiĐaŶ HistoƌǇ, eǆĐept 
incidentally. It is in the form of a disputed question, itself a form of the Socratic dialogue. It was 
born in my mind when I discovered – at a time when I was studying the Republic with Leo 
Strauss – that the issue between Lincoln and Douglas was in substance, and very nearly in form, 
ideŶtiĐal ǁith the issue ďetǁeeŶ “oĐƌates aŶd ThƌasǇŵaĐhus͛ ;ϭϵϴϮ, p. ǀͿ. 
ϳ At stake heƌe is aŶ iŶteƌestiŶg aŶd iŵpoƌtaŶt issue ƌelatiŶg to the ƋuestioŶ of liďeƌalisŵ͛s 
relationship to the War on Terror. The critical interventions of Prozorov, Odysseos and 
Mouffe, aŵoŶg otheƌs, aƌe foĐused upoŶ highlightiŶg that, iŶ the latteƌ͛s teƌŵs, ͚Bush͛s ǁaƌ 
against terrorism is presented as the direct implementation of a Schmittian understanding of the 
politiĐal. To aǀoid the ͞Đlash of ĐiǀilizatioŶs͟ to ǁhich this type of politics is leading, we must 
come back to the liberal approach and work towards the establishment of a cosmopolitan world 
oƌdeƌ͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϭϰϳͿ. While I aŵ ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ sǇŵpathetiĐ to this ĐhalleŶge to the totalisiŶg 
tendencies of (neo)liberal orthodoxy, I am not entirely sure that Schmitt offers the best means 
by which to advance this critique. For further discussion of this question, see Aggie Hirst, Leo 
Strauss and the Invasion of Iraq: Encountering the Abyss. 
ϴ That eŶeŵies Ŷeed oŶlǇ ďe ͚poteŶtial͛ is ŶoteǁoƌthǇ heƌe. It suggests that the politiĐal defiŶed iŶ 
these terms relies upon a sense of constant possible threats and dangers rather than constant 
struggle against a particular enemy. The function of such an amorphous yet ever-present threat 
is not to orient society in a constant condition of conflict but rather to situate and thereby 
contribute to rendering it a coherent social group by reference to an outside or otherness that 
threatens it. 
9 For further discussion of the question of Stƌauss͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the ĐoŶstitutioŶ of 
subjectivity, see Aggie Hirst (2010). 
10 Although other Straussians could be identified, a detailed study of these individuals 
deŵoŶstƌates sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs ďetǁeeŶ “tƌauss͛ thought aŶd theiƌ aĐtiǀities, and satisfies 
ĐƌitiĐs͛ deŵaŶds foƌ speĐifiĐitǇ. 
11 The degree to which Wolfowitz can be described as a Straussian has been a point of contention. 
While critics such as Drury (1999) and Norton (2004) identify him as belonging to this group, 
and Jeane KirkpatƌiĐk stated iŶ ϮϬϬϮ that ͚Wolfoǁitz is still a leadiŶg “tƌaussiaŶ͛ ;MaŶŶ, ϮϬϬϰ, 
p. ϮϴͿ, MiŶoǁitz Đlaiŵs, iŶ ĐoŶtƌast, that aĐĐoƌdiŶg to FƌaŶĐis FukuǇaŵa, Wolfoǁitz ͚Ŷeǀeƌ 
ƌegaƌded hiŵself as a “tƌauss pƌote´ge´͛, aŶd that he ǁas ͚ŵuĐh ŵoƌe heaǀilǇ iŶflueŶced by 
Wohlstetteƌ͛ ;ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϮϱͿ, his PhD supeƌǀisoƌ. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to “oloŵoŶ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϭϯͿ, Wolfoǁitz 
hiŵself asseƌted oŶ the ŵatteƌ: ͚I doŶ͛t paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ like the [“tƌaussiaŶ] laďel, ďeĐause I doŶ͛t 
like laďels that ŵuĐh͛. Whetheƌ this iŵplies a dislike of the “tƌaussiaŶ laďel iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ oƌ 
laďels ŵoƌe geŶeƌallǇ is uŶĐleaƌ. MiŶoǁitz ĐoŶĐedes that he ĐaŶ ďe ideŶtified as a ͚“tƌaussiaŶ ͞iŶ 
ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͟ ͛ ;ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϮϱͿ aŶd that he ͚eǆited eaƌlǇ iŶ the jouƌŶeǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϮϱϬͿ to ďeĐoŵiŶg a 
Straussian. That he may not have realised the entire process does not entail that he was not 
influenced by it, as the exploration later affirms. 
12 All three were involved in the early 1990s in the Consortium for the Study of IŶtelligeŶĐe͛s 
Working Group on Intelligence Reform, a group established explicitly to reform intelligence 
pƌaĐtiĐes that ŵet oǀeƌ a peƌiod of Ϯ Ǉeaƌs, iŶdeed “Đhŵitt ǁas the Gƌoup͛s Co-ordinator and 
co-edited the book publishing its findings. Schmitt is also a former executive director of the 
PƌesideŶt͛s FoƌeigŶ IŶtelligeŶĐe AdǀisoƌǇ Boaƌd, a positioŶ to ǁhiĐh he ǁas appoiŶted ďǇ 
Reagan in 1984, and has been involved in the activities of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence. Shulsky held a position as a senior scholar at the National Strategy Information 
Centre (NSIC), as well as working for the RAND Corporation. He was also active alongside the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the 1980s, and Director of the Office of Special Plans 
from its inception in 2002. Wolfowitz was a member of the Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community in the mid-1990s. 
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13 The question of the OSP as the appropriate name for the office within which interventions were 
made has been the suďjeĐt of soŵe deďate. The DepaƌtŵeŶt of DefeŶse͛s ϮϬϬϳ ƌeǀieǁ ĐoŶĐludes 
that the ͚teƌŵ OffiĐe of “peĐial PlaŶs has ďeĐoŵe geŶeƌiĐ teƌŵiŶologǇ foƌ the aĐtiǀities of the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, including the Policy Counter Terrorism 
EǀaluatioŶ Gƌoup aŶd PoliĐǇ “uppoƌt OffiĐe͛. The teƌŵ ǁill ďe eŵploǇed iŶ this geŶeƌiĐ 
capacity in what follows not least because those calling for the DoD inquiry, as well as the 
popular and scholarly debate surrounding the affair, have done so. 
14 This is not to suggest that such methods are themselves unproblematic nor that they should not 
be subject to critique. Rather, it is to highlight the problems associated with the deliberate 
removal of practices intended to promote the reliability of information. 
15 The connection made here between the activities of Straussians in the sphere of intelligence and 
those involved in producing the Weekly Standard is noteworthy, and will be explored later. 
16 These Straussians have considerable institutional affiliations: Jaffa is Distinguished Fellow at 
the Claremont Institute; Schmitt, Mansfield and Wolfowitz are connected to the American 
enterprise Institute; Shulsky has worked for the RAND Corporation; Kristol is closely 
connected to the Carnegie Endowment; Shulsky, Schmitt and Wolfowitz have had dealings with 
the NSIC. 
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